As the situation in Syria remains complex and fragile, Türkiye’s role in shaping the country’s future has gained increasing attention.

From 2011, when the Syrian uprisings began, until the eventual fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, Turkey was at the forefront of military, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts to manage instability along its southern border.

With the fall of Assad and the absence of Iran and Russia supporting the regime, Türkiye faces a new chapter in its strategy in Syria, which requires recalculating its goals and fears.

Syria’s unity

Ankara expressed its support for the new Syrian leadership, through high-level visits by figures such as Director of the National Intelligence Service, Ibrahim Kalin, and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who received a warm welcome from the Commander-in-Chief of the new administration, Ahmed Al Ali. -The law.

The Turkish government says that political stability in Türkiye is of the utmost importance, but it must be accompanied by the integrity of Syrian territory.

On December 25, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told the parliamentary group of his Justice and Development Party: “Security and peace in Syria may be secondary to others.

“We cannot… have such a luxury with a country with which we have a 910-kilometre border.”

Turkey stressed the need for a political transition led by all Syrians, with Fidan saying in Damascus on December 22 that the priority in Syria was “to achieve national reconciliation, ensure economic development, and create conditions that will empower Syrians affected by the conflict.” They have been separated from their homeland for years to return to their homeland.”

Creating a stable and unified Syria would also be in line with Ankara’s attempt to ease internal pressure on the country’s large number of Syrian refugees.

The opposition accused the government of mismanaging the refugee issue and blamed the refugees for the economic difficulties facing Türkiye.

Xenophobic rhetoric by far-right sectors has fueled anti-refugee sentiment across the country, which has at times led to violence against Syrians.

Rebuilding Syria

Turkey, one of the largest economies in the region with a strong construction sector, realizes its capacity when it comes to rebuilding Syria, which has been devastated over a decade in terms of economy, infrastructure and services.

Turkey’s Ministries of Transport, Energy and Natural Resources have already announced plans to repair roads, airports and energy and electricity infrastructure in Syria.

However, Syria will need more financial and donor support for development and humanitarian aid. Therefore, Türkiye will seek to establish regional coordination, especially with partners in the Gulf.

Ankara has strong ties with Qatar, and has normalized relations with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, giving it strong trade and financial ties with all three countries that it can combine with its political and diplomatic influence in Syria.

In addition to achieving the reconstruction of Syria, cooperation with the Gulf could bring Türkiye and the Arab world closer.

It has repaired relations with all Arab countries, with the exception of Syria under Assad, with its steadfast support for the Palestinian cause, which is expected to remain a focal point of its regional policy.

While Turkey does not pursue a sectarian agenda, Iran’s perceived sectarian agenda in the region, as well as its attempt to become a regional leader, has long created a sense of mistrust and rivalry with Turkey.

Both sides are trying to limit the other’s sphere of influence, especially regarding security issues.

Question of the People’s Protection Units

The presence of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in Syria remains central to Turkey’s security strategy, as the two groups are organically linked and committed to the same ethno-nationalist separatist tendency.

The PKK has been fighting the Turkish government for decades, a conflict that has claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people. Türkiye has long considered it a “terrorist organization,” as have the United States and the European Union.

The YPG in Syria is a leading member of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, along with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), an umbrella organization for groups linked to the PKK in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Turkey. Iran.

As a result, the Turkish state is wary of the SDF even though it also includes Syrian Arab groups, creating friction with the United States.

Since 2011, the YPG has reportedly carried out numerous attacks in Türkiye by infiltrating from Syria. The Turkish government sees the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to eliminate what it considers to be its greatest security threat.

Currently, Türkiye is coordinating with the new administration in Syria regarding the YPG and wants to give the new leadership a chance to solve the problem.

Ankara has called on the YPG to disarm and integrate into Syria, but it is not clear whether it will do so.

So far, the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have proposed integration into a “new Syria” on the condition of local-level autonomy in northeastern Syria and the establishment of a demilitarized zone.

In the past, Türkiye has launched cross-border operations into Syria to target YPG fighters along its border, and may do so again if disarmament is not successful.

The YPG has support in the United States, which has armed and trained the Syrian Democratic Forces to fight ISIS in Syria.

How US President-elect Donald Trump’s Syria policy unfolds will have a direct impact on how Türkiye moves regarding the YPG.

If Türkiye launches a new operation, it will send ground forces supported by air operations. Furthermore, it may also be used by opposition forces of the Syrian National Army – which it trains and supports – as part of the offensive in areas occupied by the YPG.

Forks in the road

Internally, Syria remains fragile and vulnerable to sectarian and ethnic tensions, due to the absence of an institutional security tool. Clear examples of this include sectarian tensions and recent violence in cities such as Latakia, Tartus, and the capital, Damascus. The potential for instability is well calculated by Ankara, and a military attack on northeastern Syria could come sooner, in what Türkiye will say will avoid widespread tension within the country.

Another issue that will have profound implications for Türkiye’s Syria policy is whether the United States will continue to support the YPG instead of withdrawing its soldiers from Syria.

If the Trump administration insists on strengthening the YPG in northeastern Syria, the dialogue between Ankara and Washington may be further affected regarding the Syrian file, and the strong relations between the two leaders between Trump and Erdogan may be damaged.

Ultimately, Turkey’s firm stance on the YPG may conflict with Trump’s unpredictability, and damage bilateral relations in areas outside Syria, including trade, the defense industry, and investments.

Another critical risk facing Turkey is the increasing Israeli encroachment on Syrian territory outside the occupied Golan Heights, which Turkey views as a threat not only to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but also to Turkish national security.

The expansion may turn into a confrontation because Ankara believes that Israel will not stop the expansion in Syria and may eventually threaten Türkiye directly.

Erdogan has said, on several occasions, that if Israel is not stopped, it “will eventually target Anatolia with its illusions about the promised land.”