Donald Trump’s second term was launched in his position with a whirlwind of changes to the current situation in Washington, DC, and for American relations with the world.

The rapid pace of leaving al -Qaeda – from targeting Canada, the United States’s fixed ally, with a larger tariff than China, is floating on the American occupation in Gaza, to the threat of Greenland’s attachment and the decision to communicate with Russian President Vladimir Putin to try to end the war in Okreen – confused, and deep.

Trump’s tariff may not be the most shocking foreign policy in his second administration, but it may end up until it is the most dependent in the long term.

Like all foreign policy movements in its title, his plan for definitions is also part of his excessive game plan to reshape the American economy. He says he will impose a tariff on Europe, China, and anyone else who trades with the United States to re -manufacture home, and “make America great again.”

But in this case, Trump’s boldness is unlikely to bring him close to his long -term goals due to the unintended effect that these customs duties will eventually make on the US dollar.

The costs of manufacturing in the United States are much higher than they are even in Europe, not to mention Asia, and therefore the immediate impact of its definitions and threats to definitions is to raise inflation expectations as well as starting a new cycle of the power of the US dollar against other leading currencies. Although it may seem that the strongest dollar would weaken inflation, the tariff and its threat add additional costs to circulation, which reduces this potential benefit. In addition, the US Federal Reserve has stopped the price cutting course even if other central banks, such as the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, have pushed forward, as their fears of renewed inflation were replaced by the need to stimulate growth in the face of commercial threats.

However, the structure of the international monetary system, which is already dominated by the US dollar, means that the expectations of the highest return of US assets will increase the dollar’s strengthening.

For a long time, the global demand for the American currency meant that its primary export was its currency and relevant financial products. This is unique “Excessive privilege“Washington enabled the management of both the trade and financial deficit without any major traction on the economy.

Trump has increasingly realized the importance of protecting this system, threatening customs tariffs by 100 percent and other measures against countries that seek to cancel the clarification of the “Brexes” backed by Russia and those with support.

Trump believes that his mission is not just the rearranging of the financial policy to support the United States for local industrialization, but it is one of the new rules for the international monetary system as well. Simply put, the president wants to ensure that the US dollar can trade more quickly compared to other currencies with the lack of undermining the centrality of the currency – especially the US government securities – in the international monetary system.

This has discussed whether the Trump administration was aimed at reaching new stability deals in dollars with other governments and central banks that resemble those who managed Reagan in the 1980s, known as Plaza Accord and Dortare Accord. In fact, the Trump administration is trying to reach the so-called “Mar-A-Lago” agreement has become a frequent point of discussion between economists.

However, this step will be very difficult because, unlike the dollar stabilization agreements dating back to the Reagan era, where the focus on Japan, any agreement would have to focus on China. At that time, the United States saw that the Japanese yen’s imagined weakness represents a threat to its interests and behaved to correct it. This was not a big challenge because Tokyo was – and still – an ally of us. China, however, is not like that. It is much less interested in any such negotiations, and the legacy of those deals in the 1980s – in Japan, has strengthened the yen as a result of these agreements often is not seen as a basic factor in the subsequent “lost contracts” in the country – it is often martyred as an example of the reason for strengthening them against the dollar of major risks.

Trump is ready to strike this system to secure concessions and achieve his long -term goals, even when they have nothing to do with trade. Even the most withmer allies should prepare for threats that exceed the definitions. He was predicted in his threat in late January of “Treasury and Banking and Financial Services” against Colombia if the military aircraft that offer the deportees – moves designated for rogue states such as North Korea, Iran and Russia.

Such threats of economic destruction predicted much more than customs tariffs due to the US dollar, government securities, and the centrality of the wider financial system of the global economy.

However, the Trump administration’s willingness to use such threats against allies means that it has no little hope to introduce any negotiations with China with its allies support it economically. Beijing and other supporters of the dollar system will seek to exploit these weaknesses. For example, for Putin, this is a more important goal than weakening NATO-the dollar regime was almost and a half times as the military alliance has mentioned since its full invasion of Ukraine.

Trump is trying to rearrange the international monetary system to benefit from the United States, but so far his actions indicate that his understanding of him is at best. This was not more clear than it was when he was asked about the levels of NATO spending in Spain shortly after his inauguration, as he was offended the country as a member of the Brex.

The US dollar system was never a completely American system. It was born in a large part of it in Europe, where banks began issuing loans in dollars in the fifties to meet regional financing and demand needs. As such, by raising the level of foreign policy between the United States and Europe it is supposed to “make America great again”, Trump unintentionally ended in the dollar system, which was responsible for a large part of the strength and America for decades.

The main difference between those countries that are members of the BRICS and European Bloc, such as Spain, is that the members of the Brexes are all almost all international commercial surpluses, and they export more than their import, while they always maintain important capital controls.

On the other hand, the commercial power in Europe is not sufficient to maintain the levels of government spending in most of the European Union or the United Kingdom. It is also not in Japan, which does not exceed the debt number to the gross domestic product from any other pioneering economy. On the other hand, after the United States, these historical allies are the main borrowers in the international capital markets, while capital is from the excess countries from earning the wheel, like many members of the Brexes, they are those who seek to invest in it. This is why China is the first holder of the United States Treasury despite the geopolitical competition in Washington Boik.

Trump’s movements – such as customs tariffs and annexation threats directed at the Allies – tend to undermine this system. His geopolitical threats that aim to rearrange the monetary system to Beijing may be targeted, but his approach not only risk violating political alignment between the United States and its historical allies, but also their economic alliance.

If Trump is successful in his approach, he may have some benefits for us. Certainly, growth is one of the gross domestic production in the current industrialization in manufacturing. But the risk is that in the goal, the US dollar system blows. It will be destroyed by the American economy, which probably leads to not only activating the large inflation, but also a dramatic stagnation.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the editorial island.