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Putin may well get what he wants in Ukraine | Russia-Ukraine war

After the long phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump, who followed the aftermath of the United States -Ukrainian talks in Jeddah last week, it appears that the war in Ukraine is entering its last stages.

It seems that both Moscow and Kiev agree with Trump’s pursuit of peace, although the details of their details are still blurry.

Kiev agreed to Washington’s suggestion for an unconditional shooting for 30 days, followed by peace talks. The freezing of the conflict before the start of peace talks was not what Ukraine wanted, but the possibility of losing more lands, infrastructure and human life – probably – American support, has brought them on board.

Russia has agreed, for its part, to suspend missile attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure for 30 days, with discussions continuing a full ceasefire. Earlier, Moscow has expressed concern not only about logistical services to carry out a ceasefire and guarantee to prevent violations, but also about what comes yet.

Caution is due to the fact that Russia has an advantage in the battlefield, which is not keen to lose before setting a settlement framework in the stone. However, Russian officials seemed very optimistic about the chances of settlement after Trump’s invitation to Putin.

If the ceasefire negotiations advance, the question that it asks is whether Putin is likely to get everything he wants in February 2022 when he launched the brutal invasion of Ukraine.

The harsh framework for the settlement of peace that can be achieved realisticly to all parties now. Moscow has repeatedly mentioned that the peace agreement is to follow the outlines of the Istanbul agreements developed by Russian and Ukrainian delegations in the spring of 2022, but it was eventually disposed of by Ukraine under British and American pressure.

These agreements were depicting the neutrality of Ukraine, the maximum size of its army and measures to protect the Russian speakers living in Ukraine.

After three years of war, Moscow now wants to recognize Kiev about the loss of four Ukrainian regions – Donetsk, Luhanssk, Khairsson and Zaburizia – whose lands have officially declared Russia even though it has not yet fully occupied any of them. However, the Kremlin can create the maximum demand for Ukraine to withdraw from the unveiled parts of these areas.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Voludimir Zelinski indicated that regional talks will include the fate of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which is currently occupied by Russia and is very close to the confrontation line. If Russia becomes part of that conversation, this means that it no longer demands the variable north of Zaborisia and – along – the lands not occupied in the other three regions.

Discussions about the nuclear factory are a good sign because it indicates a transformation into realistic concessions that can be extracted by the West and Ukraine from Russia instead of completely unrealistic demands for NATO shoes on the ground in the “peace lawyer”, which the United Kingdom and France pay for.

The key to understanding the logic of Putin is accepting that he is not fighting for land. The comprehensive invasion, which now led to the occupation of five Ukrainian lands, is seen as a punishment for Ukraine that departs from the path of agreements 2015-2016 Minsk, which was imagining the two separatist regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, in light of the official control of Okreen. Russia’s annexation of these two regions, along with Jeuceon and Zaburisia, was punishment against Ukraine as he was walking away from the Istanbul agreements.

While the nuclear power plant can be replaced by some other political concessions or-probably-related to the rights of Russian speakers and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that communicates with Moscow, what is not implemented for Putin is NATO countries that maintain any security infrastructure or influence Ukrainian security bodies.

Rooted in the Western decision In the 1990s to confront the newly emerged democratic Russia rather than merge it, this conflict revolves around drawing a thick red line in which the American-led West will expand at least until the time when the conversation about the Western integration of Russia becomes possible again.

At the present time, though, Putin will insist not only on the neutrality of Ukraine but also to remove what he describes as “NATO infrastructure”, which includes military training and logistical facilities as well CIA listening stations Along the Russian border.

It is also possible to demand the removal of the West between the Ukrainian security structures affiliated with the CIA and MI6, such as the Main Intelligence Directorate (Hur) and some security service cities in Ukraine (SBU).

More importantly, Kyiv and Nato Renege will insist at the 2008 Buchaarest summit to become Ukraine as a member of the alliance. This commitment, which was imposed by US President George W. Bush, caused tectonic changes in Russian foreign policy, which led to the conflict with Georgia and then Ukraine.

If we rule through references emanating from the Trump administration, all of these goals can be achieved along with the lifting of sanctions against Russia – at least by the United States itself. For its part, the Kremlin indicated that it could agree that 300 billion dollars in the frozen Russian assets in the West can be used to rebuild post -war in Ukraine. He sees that this money is already lost and may consider that this charitable gesture can help her start repair relationships with a very hostile neighbor.

If he can get all of this, Putin will see his decision to become a criminal of war by launching brutal aggression against the closest neighbor of Russia in terms of social, ethnic, cultural and economic terms as justified.

In addition to securing the neutrality of Ukraine and pushing NATO beyond the Russian border, Putin is also obligated to achieve another goal: restoring the position of the great power in Russia in the eyes of the whole world.

For Western leaders, failure to rein in Russia will lead to a late awareness: that the main nuclear force, capable of destroying humanity, cannot be removed militarily. They may then think about the fact that Moscow can be affected greatly by soft power – something that the West practiced more successfully during the Cold War.

Russia will remain culturally and economically on Europe as it has always been. This will keep it as part of European society, regardless of what society itself thinks in Russia. This creates more strategic opportunities for the West to reduce the threats emanating from Moscow instead of engaging in what Western officials now call a “agent war” in Ukraine.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the editorial island.

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2025-03-18 19:01:00

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