How 2024 reordered the Middle East

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The writer is Director of Regional Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies He is co-editor of the newly released report “Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security and Energy Dynamics.”

If there was ever a time to use superlatives in Middle Eastern affairs, it is 2024. The chain of events that began in October 2023 has been nothing short of astonishing. If this massive mix of tragic, astonishing and strategic events takes time to settle down, what has already happened will undoubtedly have long-lasting effects.

The diverse and fragile societies of the Levant are already witnessing radical historical transformations. In doing so, they are unlikely to find much outside help given domestic hesitation and global fatigue. The reordering of the region is accompanied by major violence and renewed competition.

The Palestinians are suffering unprecedented suffering in Gaza at the hands of the Israeli army. Hamas’ bloody, failed bet, and the inability of its partners to come to the rescue, is a reminder, if one were needed, that the only path to establishing a Palestinian state is to internationalize it and reach a negotiated outcome. The coalition for a two-state solution, organized by Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries, and European countries, has emerged as the most likely means of achieving this. The Palestinians will need to be convinced that this is more than a symbolic diplomatic dance, but they must also prove ownership of the process, something only long-overdue PA reform will do. However, these aspirations remain vulnerable to Israeli intransigence and the potential anger of Donald Trump.

In parallel, Israeli society went from severe shock to military victory in just over a year. This has reinforced the belief that Israel can rely only on its military might and that expansion into Gaza, the occupied West Bank and now southern Syria is not only justified, but required. The unconditional support that Israel receives from the United States and many European countries has allowed it to ignore the necessity of a just peace that would provide security for all.

But this security-only mentality has harmful consequences. It is costly, increases dependence on the United States, and alienates current and potential partners in the region, who fear that Israel will expand the conflict by striking Iran’s leadership and nuclear facilities. The damage to the reputation of the Gaza war is enormous, and legal liabilities loom large. The authority of Benjamin Netanyahu and his extremist followers appears to be secure as internal divisions over the nature of the Israeli state increase.

For the Lebanese, there is an opposite dynamic. The arrogant Hezbollah must take into account the collapse of its military strategy, ideological rhetoric, and overall credibility. Reviving the spirit of resistance is extremely difficult given the need to lick its deep wounds, the sudden loss of Syria and the difficult plight of its voters. Many Lebanese who feel they have an opportunity face two opposing forces: they realize that they will not have more opportunities to reform their country, but they also recognize the risk of provoking a wounded Hezbollah, which could spark internal conflict.

Above all, Syrians are tasting freedom for the first time after decades of oppression. The rot of the Assad regime has allowed it to collapse rapidly, devoid of frightening scenes of mass sectarian violence. Instead, the new Islamic administration in Damascus showed restraint and some wisdom. However, securing peace will require massive acts of magnanimity and dedication to inclusive governance despite internal and external spoilers.

At the very least, Syrians can enjoy the fact that they have exposed the flaws of realpolitik. It is a great irony that a decade ago, most Arab and Western countries wanted the Assad regime to leave, but the Syrians were divided. As of early December, many Arab and Western countries wanted Assad to stay, but Syrians were largely united to force internal change. They will now need foreign good will. In order to reach Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, Turkish moderation and American diplomacy will be extremely important. To reassure the Alawite community, Russian mediation could be useful. Gulf states can help neutralize Iranian influence.

Iran is the undeniable loser in all of this. It has partnered with militias to consolidate its influence in broken states and divided societies. They expected these groups to advance their interests, but instead they were dragged into the wars they started. Türkiye took advantage of the opportunity, outperforming Tehran in Syria, the central geopolitical arena in the region.

Many in Western capitals will be relieved that so far these historic transformations have been surprisingly contained. No massive migration crisis, no protracted war between countries, no major terrorist attack outside the region, no sustained impact on oil prices, and no resulting disruption to global trade. It is this complacency that paves the way for unwelcome surprises.