Today, we distinguish three years from Russia’s wide invasion of Ukraine. For three years, the Ukrainian people showed great flexibility, thwarting Russian plans to oppress Kiev and forcing their army to retreat from Kharkiv and Judson.

The Ukrainians are still resisting against the Russian army attack, but the war inevitably entered into the criminal stage in which every regional gain comes at an enormous cost, as it tested endurance in Ukraine and the West’s willingness to maintain support.

At this critical stage, a new administration in the United States indicated a major shift in its policy in Ukraine, calling for a rapid peace agreement. Last week, US and Russian officials He met in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia For direct negotiations without Ukraine on the table. This meeting and speech coming from Washington raised fears that the administration of President Donald Trump is setting the basis for broader concessions in the name of canceling the escalation with Russia.

For Ukraine, the main issue is not whether diplomacy should be pursued – any war ends at the negotiating table – but what are the terms that these negotiations will include. If the priority is simply stopping the fighting as quickly as possible, there is a risk of pressure on Ukraine to accept a settlement that does not address its long -term security fears that temporarily freeze the war instead of putting an end to it.

Modern history provides a clear warning against the defective “peace”. In February 2014, Russia invaded and occupied the Crimea in Ukraine; Two months later, its forces, along with the local forces loyal to Russia, fired an operation in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, where it took control of some lands. In August, Kiev was forced into the negotiations in which France and Germany mediated aimed at ending fighting under unfavorable conditions.

What has become known as the Minsk’s first agreement, signed in September of that year, did not last for more than six months. In January 2015, the sincere forces of Moscow and the ordinary Russian army units renewed their attacks on Ukraine to force them more concessions. In February 2015, what became known as the Minsk II Agreement was negotiated and signed, which led to Kiev to realize the “special situation” of two regions in Donbas in force in Russia.

Minsk Conventions eventually failed to secure a solid peace. A regulator to freeze the conflict instead of its solution, they allowed Russia to unify control of the occupied lands while maintaining Ukraine’s political and military restriction. Moscow has never committed to its obligations, using the diplomatic process to buy time, reassemble its ranks and prepare for more aggression.

Minsk’s failed agreements are a warning story: the settlements that ignore the security facts of Ukraine and societal expectations do not lead to permanent peace, but only postpone the next conflict.

It should reflect any settlement of the will of the people who endured this war for three years. Opinion polls in Ukraine clearly show what Ukrainians want.

War fatigue is real, as it is clear from a survey conducted Gallop In November, 52 percent of the respondents said they supported negotiations. However, when it comes to any regional concessions, only 27 percent said that Ukraine should consider this step. A clear majority of Ukrainians refuses to abandon any land as part of the peace agreement.

These numbers highlight an inevitable political fact: There is no wide support in Ukraine for the peace agreement that begins the Russian regional gains. Any Ukrainian leadership trying to negotiate such conditions will face tremendous public pressure. Even if an agreement is reached at the diplomatic level, attempts to implement them will face fierce resistance locally.

This is why we and other Western policy makers who defend an urgent decision cannot ignore the will of the Ukrainian people. If they want a peace agreement, they must think about the continuous support of the Ukrainian army. Ukraine’s ability to negotiate the position of strength depends on continuous military success and a unified position on its allies.

In making decisions regarding their policy in Ukraine, Western countries should not fall into the defective narration in Russia. Moscow tries to create the illusion of strength while hiding the growing weaknesses.

Russian officials insisted that the Russian economy is stable despite the sanctions, their military operations are sustainable and time alongside them. In the Riyadh talks, Russian actors are said to have suggested that companies in Moscow are thrived, restaurants are full and the only Western economies suffering from long participation in Ukraine.

The message was clear: Russia could fight as long as it took while the West faces decreasing returns. This framework in the West has concluded that a quick peace deal – one depends on Ukrainian privileges – may be the most pragmatic way forward.

But it is not. Russia will only increase its appetite for more aggression.

A way to ensure peace in Ukraine is to create a strong safety framework after the war. Either by NATO integration, bilateral defense agreements or the European -led security framework, Ukraine needs tangible security obligations. If this is absent from any peace settlement, the risk of renewing the conflict will remain high.

The coming months will be very important as Washington re -evaluates its role in Ukraine. Although many are unknown, one clear fact: the Battle of Ukraine is not only related to the restoration of lost lands, but also about ensuring that its sovereignty is no longer a question. Whether Western policy continues to comply with this goal or turn towards a more transaction approach, it will form the next stage of the war.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the editorial island.