The Israeli military investigation in a series of errors in the previous period and during the Hamas -led attack on October 7, 2023, a “complete army failed” to prevent it.

In what investigators say it was a very coordinated attack that took years of planning, groups of fighters led by Hamas broke out from Gaza and attacked Israeli societies and a musical festival along the border.

In total, 1139 people died during the attack and about 250 prisoners.

The report shows the history of misconceptions about the dangers posed by Hamas and refused to accept the warning signs of an attack, as well as the army’s inability to coordinate the response.

While the report put many Israeli army failures on October 7, 2023, similar investigations have been banned in political failures over and over again by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right -wing alliance.

How did the Israeli army reduce Hamas?

The report says that the army has a “basic misunderstanding” for decades of Hamas, leading senior officers to reduce the group’s capabilities and intentions.

The military planners did not pose that Hamas had not pose any major threat to Israel and that he was not interested in a widespread war, according to the investigators.

The planners also believe that the Hamas tunnel networks have deteriorated significantly, with any threat across the border easily by the highly chapter technology barrier in Israel.

Despite the warning signs, such as unusual activities by Hamas fighters, the Israeli authorities insisted that the group was focusing on maintaining governance inside Gaza and will attack Israel through the missile, instead of a widespread ground invasion.

They also misunderstood Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, assuming that he was “not interested in a wider war.”

What is the intelligence of the warning that Israel ignored before the attack?

In the hours before the attack, the report said that the Israeli army was either ignored or misrepresented many indications that the attack was imminent.

In the evening before the attack, many observers alerted their leaders to an extraordinary activity along the border. In addition, the officers reported the mass activation of Israeli SIM cards known as in the hands of Hamas fighters, in addition to suspicious movements in the deployment of the Hamas missile;

However, the leaders instead relied on what they said were “reassuring signs” that Hamas was simply conducting a military exercise.

How did Israeli intelligence misinterpret events?

According to the report, Hamas began thinking about the October 2023 incursion early 2016.

However, the intelligence community in Israel rejected reports such as “unrealistic”, believing that Hamas had been deterred by the Israeli response to the uprising in May 2021, When Israel killed 232 people in Gaza.

The Israeli army has since realized that Hamas decided early April 2022 to launch its attack. By September of that year, he was 85 percent ready and in May 2023, he was appointed on October 7.

What were the Israeli operational failures on that day?

a lot.

Investigators found that the army was not ready to attack, and the deployment of forces was greatly delayed, allowing Palestinian fighters to continue without immediate resistance.

In one of Kibbutz, Nir Oz, who accused the army of abandoning him, a later told the Israeli chief of staff that the last Palestinian fighter had left before the first Israeli soldier entered.

Fighters’ numbers are also found to be wide from the mark, reducing the size of the attack.

He later decided that 5,600 fighters crossed the border in three waves, supported by Bubble from about 4000 rockets and 57 drones.

As a result, the division of Israeli Gaza into more than 700 soldiers was mired, and without hours, they remained “defeated”, and the military planners were unaware of that while coordinating their response.

It was not until about 12 pm [10:00 GMT]When the reinforcements began to reach, the Gaza section began to work.

The report also indicated that the Israeli Air Force is fighting to distinguish between Hamas fighters and Israeli civilians. While the report avoids going into the details, the army accepted that some Israelis were killed by friendly fire.

Investigators found that many aircraft had been deployed against the homes of senior Hamas leaders in Gaza instead of defending civilians and soldiers who are being attacked.

Did the leaders ask for Hannibal?

According to many Israeli newspapers, yes, many civilians died as a result.

Hannibal, who orders that the Israeli army to employ all possible force to prevent Israeli fighters from the prisoner, including the killing of anyone around them, was requested during the attack, the Israeli daily, Haritz I mentioned.

As such, orders were issued on October 7 to the Israeli forces to prevent Hamas from returning to Gaza with the prisoners “at any price” that included the killing of non -civilian fighters.

It is said that some pilots who were flying over the battlefield were unwilling to act based on guidance and sometimes they were completely stopped from shooting, from concern about hitting civilians.

However, subsequent investigations showed that many civilians were killed as a result of Hannibal’s direction.

one, Evat Katz, was killed by The helicopter fire while being transported to Gaza by Hamas fighters.

At Kibbutz Be’eri, an Israeli tank fired two straws in a well -known house that holds more than ten prisoners, including 12 -year -old twins. Only two prisoners survived.

What are the main meals?

Before the attack, the main warnings were ignored or interpreted, such as increasing combat activity and intelligence reports.

The assessments conducted by the Israeli army reduced the size of the attack, with poor communication and weak intelligence exchange between leaders.

The Israeli army was slow to respond to the Hamas -led attack and the reinforcements were very slow to reach.

No similar investigation was conducted in government actions before and during the attack.